Mechanisms and Representations of Language-Mediated Visual Attention by Falk Huettig et al.
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 09 January 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00394
Mechanisms and representations of language-mediated
visual attention
Falk Huettig1,2*, Ramesh Kumar Mishra3 and Christian N. L. Olivers4
1 Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, Netherlands
2 Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
3 Centre of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India
4 Cognitive Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Edited by:
Andriy Myachykov, University of
Glasgow, UK
Reviewed by:
Christoph Scheepers, University of
Glasgow, UK
Gerry Altmann, University of York, UK
*Correspondence:
Falk Huettig, Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics, P.O. Box 310, 6500
AH Nijmegen, Netherlands.
e-mail: falk.huettig@mpi.nl
The experimental investigation of language-mediated visual attention is a promising way to
study the interaction of the cognitive systems involved in language, vision, attention, and
memory. Here we highlight four challenges for a mechanistic account of this oculomotor
behavior: the levels of representation at which language-derived and vision-derived repre-
sentations are integrated; attentional mechanisms; types of memory; and the degree of
individual and group differences. Central points in our discussion are (a) the possibility that
local microcircuitries involving feedforward and feedback loops instantiate a common rep-
resentational substrate of linguistic and non-linguistic information and attention; and (b) that
an explicit working memory may be central to explaining interactions between language
and visual attention.We conclude that a synthesis of further experimental evidence from a
variety of ﬁelds of inquiry and the testing of distinct, non-student, participant populations
will prove to be critical.
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INTRODUCTION
A hallmark of human cognition is its ability to integrate rapidly
perceptual (e.g., visual or auditory) inputwith stored linguistic and
non-linguistic mental representations. This is particularly appar-
ent during language-mediated eye gaze, a behavior almost all of
us are engaged in every day. For instance, when a mother asks
her child to “look at the frog” or, during dinner, we are asked to
“pass the salt,” linguistic and visual systems, attention and memory
processes, must all be quickly integrated. Yet we know surpris-
ingly little about the nature of these cognitive interactions and the
representations involved.
How higher level representations involved in language and
memory interact with visual input during language-mediated eye
gaze has most directly been explored in the visual world para-
digm in psycholinguistics and the visual search paradigm in the
ﬁeld of visual attention. In the visual world paradigm, participants
hear an utterance while looking at a visual display (e.g., a semi-
realistic scene, or four spatially distinct objects, or printed words;
Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus et al., 1995; see Huettig et al., 2011b, for
review). Typically, the display includes objects mentioned in the
utterance as well as distractor objects that are not mentioned. The
spoken utterances can be instructions to the participants (“direct
action” tasks, e.g., “Pick up the candy,” Allopenna et al., 1998) or
descriptions or comments on the display (“look and listen” tasks,
e.g., Huettig and Altmann, 2005). In the latter case, the partic-
ipants are asked to look at the screen and to listen carefully to
the sentences. The participants’ eye movements are recorded for
later analyses. Some visual world studies have examined whether
items that are phonologically, semantically, or visually related (so-
called competitors) to a critical spoken word attract attention.
Other studies have investigated how the listeners’ perception of
the scene and/or their world knowledge about scenes and events
affect their understanding of the spoken utterances (e.g., whether
listeners anticipate up-coming words). In the visual search para-
digm, participants are presented with a display of multiple objects
and their task is to ﬁnd a pre-speciﬁed target (deﬁned by a certain
feature) as quickly as possible (see Wolfe, 1998, for a review). In
most studies of these studies, it is assumed that participants will
set up some sort of “perceptual” template (or “attentional set”)
of the target (e.g., when told to “look for the red square”) for the
remainder of the task. The goal of most visual search studies is
to investigate the interaction between the bottom-up salience of
the stimulus and the top-down goals of the observer (e.g., Treis-
man and Sato, 1990; Humphreys and Müller, 1993; Wolfe, 1994;
Cave, 1999; Itti and Koch, 2000; Palmer et al., 2000). An important
difference between the two paradigms is that in the visual world
paradigm the visual display precedes (or occurs simultaneously)
with the spoken instruction (or sentence) whereas in visual search
studies the (linguistic or visual) instruction precedes the search
display.
In short, the main interest of researchers using the visual world
paradigm tends to be on aspects of linguistic processing whereas
visual search investigators are primarily interested in what deter-
mines the efﬁciency of the search process, how easily conjunctions
of basic features (e.g., color and shape) can be found, and whether
search involves serial or parallel processing. These distinct focal
points of interest have resulted in a theoretical no-man’s land in
which the exact nature of the interaction of linguistic and visual
processing, and of attention and memory, have been left largely
unexplored.
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The aimof the present paper is to highlight, (a) theoretical chal-
lenges to explaining how language, vision, memory, and attention
interact and, (b) empirical challenges in view of recent data with
young children and illiterates/low literates in the visual world par-
adigm. We argue that existing theoretical proposals do not discuss
(at all or in sufﬁcient detail) four major underpinnings of this ocu-
lomotor behavior: levels of representation involved, attentional
mechanisms, the nature of memory, and the degree of individual
and group differences.
We will therefore ﬁrst discuss the levels of representation at
which language-derived and vision-derived representations are
integrated (see Levels of Representation). An explanation of atten-
tion will be central for a mechanistic account about how this
oculomotor behavior is instantiated and thus, in Section “Atten-
tion,” we consider the attentional mechanisms which may under-
lie language-mediated eye gaze. Language–vision interactions of
course also involve temporary and long-term memory storage;
we reﬂect on what types of memory may be involved and their
nature (see Memory). In Section “Individual and Group Differ-
ences,” before concluding, we discuss empirical challenges for the
investigation of the mechanisms and representations shared by
language, vision, attention, and memory; in particular the need to
study distinct, non-student, participant populations.
LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION
To understand how language interacts with vision, it is necessary
to establish what knowledge types are retrieved when someone is
confronted with both language and visual input, as well as how
these linguistic and visual representations interact. Furthermore,
such representations are likely to change over time as the linguistic
input unfolds and the visual image has been available for some
time. An early linguistic–visual linking hypothesis was proposed
by Tanenhaus and collaborators (Allopenna et al., 1998) which
Huettig and McQueen (2007) termed the phonological mapping
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, phonological representa-
tions are activated by both spoken words and visual objects (i.e.,
the names of the objects in the display). A match in phonolog-
ical representations retrieved from both modalities results in an
increased likelihood of a saccade toward the location of the (par-
tially) matching visual source. This is in line with many models
of spoken word recognition which assume that at a phonologi-
cal level different candidate words are considered in parallel (cf.
Marslen-Wilson andWelsh, 1978;Marslen-Wilson,1987). Contin-
uous mapping models of spoken word recognition (e.g., McClel-
land and Elman, 1986; Gaskell and Marslen-Wilson, 1997) assume
that lexical access during spoken word recognition is continuous
and thus predict that rhyming words (e.g., beaker/speaker) should
also be at least weakly activated.
Consistent with these models, Allopenna et al. (1998) observed
that the likelihood of ﬁxations to both a picture of a beaker and
a picture of a beetle increased as participants heard the word
“beaker.” As acoustic information from “beaker” started to mis-
match with the phonological information of “beetle,” the likeli-
hood of looks to the beetle decreased as the likelihood of looks to
the beaker continued to rise. In addition, looks to a picture of a
speaker started to increase as the end of the word“beaker”acousti-
cally unfolded. The ﬁnding that simulations with the TRACE
model (McClelland and Elman, 1986) of speech perception,which
includes an explicit phoneme layer, closely ﬁt the eye movement
data of Allopenna et al. (1998) provided further support for the
phonological mapping hypothesis.
It is however important to note that the many demonstrations
of the inﬂuence of acoustic–phonetic information in visual world
studies (e.g.,McMurray et al., 2002; Salverda et al., 2003; Shatzman
and McQueen, 2006) are consistent with the phonological map-
ping hypothesis but do not necessarily provide support for it. This
is because there is general agreement that spokenword recognition
is a cascaded rather than a strictly serial process (e.g., that infor-
mation from the acoustic signal cascades to higher levels before
processing at lower levels is completed) and that thus activation of
word form representations cascades further to, for instance, mor-
phological, semantic, and syntactic representational levels. Thus,
the initial phonological representations retrieved on hearing the
spoken word “beaker” may activate semantic representations of
beakers as well as beetles, and the mapping between spoken words
and the different competing visual objectsmay therefore take place
at the level of semantic/conceptual rather than phonological (or
phonetic) representations. This is the semantic mapping hypothe-
sis. One could go even further than that and argue that activation
of phonetic and semantic representations automatically spreads
to the associated visual shapes and thus the match with the visual
input occurs at a perceptual level. We could call this the visual
mapping hypothesis.
Semantic mapping effects were ﬁrst reported by Cooper (1974),
who observed that participants were more likely to ﬁxate pictures
showing a snake, a zebra, or a lion when hearing the semantically
related word “Africa” than they were to ﬁxate referents of semanti-
cally unrelated control words.However,Cooper did not investigate
systematically the nature of the semantic effects he observed (e.g.,
the words “Africa” and “lion” are not only semantically but also
associatively related, as they often co-occur, like “computer” and
“mouse”). Huettig and Altmann, 2005, see also Yee and Sedivy,
2001, 2006; Dunabeitia et al., 2009) further pursued Cooper’s
ﬁnding by investigating whether semantic properties of spoken
words could direct eye gaze toward objects in the visual ﬁeld in
the absence of any associative relationships. Huettig and Altmann
(2005) found that participants directed overt attention toward a
depicted object (e.g., a trumpet) when a semantically related but
not associatively related target word (e.g., “piano”) acoustically
unfolded, and that the likelihood of ﬁxation was proportional
to the degree of conceptual overlap (cf. Cree and McRae, 2003).
In a similar study (Huettig et al., 2006; see also Yee et al., 2009)
observed that several corpus-based measures of word semantics
(latent semantic analysis, Landauer and Dumais, 1997; contex-
tual similarity,McDonald, 2000) each correlated well with ﬁxation
behavior. Thus, language-mediated eye movements are a sensitive
indicator of the degree of overlap between the semantic informa-
tion conveyed by speech and the conceptual knowledge retrieved
from visual objects. The fact that phonological relationships were
avoided between spoken words and visual objects in the semantic
studies shows that semantic mapping behavior can occur in the
absence of phonological mapping.
Evidence for visual mapping (i.e., increased looks to visually
related entities, e.g., matching in color or shape) have also been
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observed. For example, participants shifted overt attention to a
picture of a cable during the acoustic unfolding of theword“snake”
(shape being the obvious match here, Huettig and Altmann, 2004,
2007; Dahan and Tanenhaus, 2005). In a related study,Huettig and
Altmann (2004) found that participants shifted their eye gaze to
a picture of a strawberry when they heard “lips” (presumably on
the basis of the typical color of these objects). The likelihood of
ﬁxating a particular visual object thus reﬂects the overlap between
stored knowledge of visual features of a word’s referent, accessed
on hearing the spoken word, and visual features extracted from
the objects in the visual environment.
It is important to note that there are two possible ways in which
visual mapping may occur: between the typical visual form of
the referent retrieved on hearing the spoken word (e.g., the typ-
ical shape of snakes on hearing “snake” or the typical color of
lips on hearing “lips”) and the perceived visual form or color of
the displayed object (in absence of any stored visual form object
knowledge) and/or the stored knowledge about the typical visual
form or color of the displayed object (as retrieved from viewing
the object). The shape of an object, the long and thin form of a
cable, or the color of a strawberry, can be perceived but is also
known. Eye movements that are contingent upon currently per-
ceived information (which may be temporarily stored in visual
working memory) cannot easily be dissociated from eye move-
ments that are contingent upon stored information about object
form (see also Yee et al., 2011). To investigate this issue Huettig
and Altmann (2011) manipulated the presence of color in a series
of experiments. The conceptual representation of an object’s color
(i.e., the stored color knowledge about an object) and the perceived
but non-diagnostic color of an object (i.e., its surface color) can be
dissociated. Participants were presented with spoken target words
whose concepts are associated with a typical color (e.g.,“spinach”)
while their eye gaze was monitored to (i) objects associated with
the same typical color but presented in black and white (e.g., a
black and white line drawing of a frog), (ii) objects associated with
the same typical color but presented in an appropriate but atypical
color (e.g., a color photograph of a yellow frog), and (iii) objects
typically not associated with the color but presented in the color
associated with the target concept (e.g., a green blouse). No effect
of stored object color knowledge was found when black and white
line drawings or black andwhite photoswere used.A small effect of
stored object color knowledge was found when color photographs
were used depicting the target object (e.g., a frog) in an atypical
but appropriate color (e.g., a yellow frog). The ﬁnding that the
effect was marginal and occurred more than 1 s after information
from the acoustic target word started to become available sug-
gests that stored object color, if anything, has a minor inﬂuence
on language-mediated eye movements. In contrast, Huettig and
Altmann (2011) found a large bias toward objects displayed in
the same surface color (as the prototypical color associated with
the spoken word) even though the referent of the picture (e.g.,
a green blouse) was not itself associated with that color. These
experiments suggest that online visual mapping between spoken
words and visual objects is mainly contingent upon the perceived
visual information (temporarily stored in visual working mem-
ory) rather than stored object form or color knowledge accessed
on viewing the visual objects. Overall thus, three main hypotheses
(visual, phonological, and semantic mapping) about the represen-
tational levels at which linguistic and visual input match have been
proposed. Some recent research has been directed at evaluating
these hypotheses.
To counter criticism that looks to phonological competitors
in the visual world paradigm might just be due to strategic
covert object naming rather than normal lexical analysis of the
spoken words (i.e., that the phonological effects reﬂect a match
between the phonological input of the spoken words with strate-
gically retrieved object names bypassing further lexical analysis of
the spoken words), Dahan and Tanenhaus (2005) have recently
argued that the visual competition effects are “inconsistent with
the hypothesis that eye movements merely reﬂect a match between
the unfolding speech and pre-activated phonological representa-
tions associated with object locations” (p. 457). They then go on
to claim that mapping occurs at the perceptual level, not the lex-
ical level. This is correct in the sense that visual (and semantic)
effects also occur in absence of phonological overlap, ruling out the
claim that “word–object matching” in the visual world paradigm
is entirely due to phonological mapping. The visual effects how-
ever do not rule out that phonological and semantic mapping (at
least sometimes) occur. Moreover, from word–object mapping at
a phonological level of representation does not necessarily follow
that there is no further lexical analysis of the spoken words.
There is evidence from other paradigms showing that viewers
often access the names of objects, even when they do not intend
to name them (e.g., Noizet and Pynte, 1976; Zelinsky and Mur-
phy, 2000; Morsella and Miozzo, 2002; Navarette and Costa, 2005;
Meyer and Damian, 2007; Meyer et al., 2007; Mani and Plunkett,
2010). Noizet and Pynte (1976) for instance asked their partic-
ipants to shift eye gaze to three objects, one after another, and
to identify them silently. Participants were told that no response
was required and that they would not be tested afterward. Noizet
and Pynte (1976) observed that participants gazed about 200 ms
longer at objects with multi-syllable names (e.g., hélicoptère) than
objects with one-syllable names (e.g.,main; see Zelinsky and Mur-
phy, 2000, for a similar result). Morsella and Miozzo (2002) used a
picture–picture version of the Stroop task in which speakers were
shownpairs of superimposedpictures andwere instructed toname
one picture and ignore the other. They found that participants
were faster at naming pictures with distractors that were phono-
logically related. Thus, the pictures participants were instructed
to ignore exerted a phonological inﬂuence on production which
suggests that participants retrieved the phonological forms of the
names of the distractor pictures. As a ﬁnal example, Mani and
Plunkett (2010) recently showed that even 18-months-olds implic-
itly name visual objects and that these implicitly generated phono-
logical representations prime the infants’ subsequent responses in
a paired visual object spoken word recognition task. These results
suggest that viewing a display of visual objects does result in lex-
ical analysis of the displayed objects, at least in these tasks and if
participants have sufﬁcient time to inspect the scene/display.
Huettig and McQueen (2007) tested the hypothesis that neither
the simple phonological or visual or semantic mapping hypothe-
ses are correct and that instead there appears to be a complex
three-way tug of war among matches on all three levels of rep-
resentation. In four experiments, participants listened to spoken
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sentences including a critical word. The visual displays contained
four spatially distinct visual items (a phonological, a semantic, and
a visual competitor of the critical spoken word, and a completely
unrelated distractor).Whenparticipantswere given sufﬁcient time
to look at the display (i.e., before the critical spoken word), shifts
in eye gaze to the phonological competitor of the critical word
preceded shifts in eye gaze to shape and semantic competitors.
Importantly, with only 200 ms of preview of the same picture dis-
plays prior to onset of the critical word, participants no longer
preferred the phonological competitor over unrelated distractors,
and prioritized the shape and semantic competitors instead. Thus
it appears that when there is plenty of time to view the display pic-
ture processing progresses as far as retrieval of the pictures’ names.
But when there was only 200 ms of preview before the onset of the
critical spoken word, picture processing still involved retrieval of
visual and semantic features, but there was insufﬁcient time to
retrieve the pictures’ names.
Yee et al. (2011) have recently suggested that long-term knowl-
edge about an object’s form becomes available before information
about its function (cf. Schreuder et al., 1984; but see Moss et al.,
1997) based on their ﬁnding that eyemovementsmediated by con-
ceptual shape (i.e., a slice of pizza activating the round shape of
a whole pizza) were observed with 1000 ms but not with 2000 ms
preview of the visual display. The opposite pattern was observed
for looks to semantic competitors (i.e., no effects with 1000 ms but
a signiﬁcant bias with 2000 ms preview). This pattern of results
is striking but the semantic results appear to be inconsistent with
previous research since strong semantic effects have been observed
with as little as 200 ms preview in other visual world studies (see
Table 4 of Huettig and McQueen, 2007; see also Dell’Acqua and
Grainger, 1999, for evidence that 17 ms exposure to pictures of
objects is enough to activate gross semantic category informa-
tion). Future studies could usefully be directed at investigating the
differences underlying these seemingly contradictory results.
There is evidence that the nature of the visual environment
induces implicit biases toward particular types of mapping dur-
ing language-mediated visual search. This is because Huettig and
McQueen (2007) found a different pattern of results when the
pictures were replaced with printed words (the names of the same
objects as before). Under these conditions shifts in eye gaze were
directed only to the phonological competitors, both when there
was only 200 ms of preview and when the displays appeared at
sentence onset. This suggests that eye gaze is co-determined by the
type of information in the display (i.e., visual objects or words).
Further support for this notionwas provided in a subsequent series
of experiments (Huettig andMcQueen, 2011). The same sentences
and printed words as in Huettig and McQueen (2007) were used.
When semantic and shape competitors of the targets were dis-
played along with two unrelated words, signiﬁcant shifts in eye
gaze toward semantic but not shape competitors were observed
as targets were heard. The results were the same when, semantic
competitors were replaced with unrelated words, and in addition,
semantically richer sentences were presented to encourage visual
imagery, and moreover, participants rated the shape similarity of
the stimuli before doing the eye-tracking experiment. Yet none of
the cases resulted in rapid shifts in eye gaze to shape competitors,
There was a late shape-competitor bias (more than 2500 ms after
target onset) in all experiments, which shows that participants can
in principle access shape information from printed words. These
data thus show that shape information is not used in online search
of printed word displays whereas it is used with picture displays. In
other words, the likelihood of mapping between language-derived
visual representations and vision-derived visual representations is
contingent upon the nature of the visual environment. Finally, at
least when printed word displays are used, recent results suggest
that language–vision mapping can also occur at an orthographic
representational level (Salverda and Tanenhaus, 2010; see also
Myachykov et al., 2011, for discussion of mapping processes at
the syntactic level in a language production task; and Mishra and
Marmolejo-Ramos, 2010, for an embodied cognition account).
In sum, research has shown that with picture displays, ﬁxations
can be determined by matches between knowledge retrieved on
the basis of information in the linguistic and in the visual input
at phonological, semantic, and visual levels of representation.
With printed word displays, ﬁxations are determined by online
matches at phonological, semantic, and orthographic levels. The
exact dynamics of the representational level at which such map-
ping occurs however is co-determined by the timing of cascaded
processing in the spoken word and object/visual word recogni-
tion systems, by the temporal unfolding of the spoken language,
and by the nature of the visual environment (e.g., which other
representational matches are possible).
ATTENTION
The mapping hypotheses outlined so far describe the levels at
which language-derived and vision-derived representations match
during language-mediated eye gaze. They do not however provide
any mechanistic account about how this oculomotor behavior is
instantiated.Attentionwill probably be central to such an explana-
tion, as the eye movements are likely an overt expression of shifts
in the attentional landscape (such shifts may of course also occur
covertly, e.g., Posner, 1980). Within the ﬁeld of attention research,
objects in the visual ﬁeld are assumed to compete for representa-
tion, with the strongest object being selected for further behavior
(e.g., a manual or oculomotor response; Wolfe, 1994; Desimone
and Duncan, 1995; Itti and Koch, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001).
This competition is generally thought to be biased by two types of
mechanism: a bottom-up or feedforward mechanism representing
stimulus strength, and a top-down or feedback mechanism repre-
senting the current goals of the observer (see, e.g., Theeuwes, 2010,
for a review). For example, a bright red poppy in a ﬁeld of grass
may automatically capture one’s eyes, but it will especially do so if
one is looking to compile a nice bouquet of wild ﬂowers.
Note that this attentional framework is not immediately applic-
able to visual world behavior. For one, inmany visual world studies
there is no clear task goal that would a priori be expected to induce
visual biases. The task is often simply to look around and at the
same time to just listen to the spoken input. As has been pointed
out recently (Huettig et al., 2011b; Salverda et al., 2011) visual
world type interactions may well be modulated by different task
settings, but so far this has received little systematic investigation.
Furthermore, visual world experiments are typically little con-
cerned with the visual stimulus properties. The visual objects are
chosen for linguistically relevant characteristics (i.e., their names
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 394 | 4
Huettig et al. Interaction of language, vision, attention, and memory
or meanings), and not their physical characteristics (though see
Huettig and Altmann, 2004, 2007, 2011; Dahan and Tanenhaus,
2005).
We can remedy this by assuming that not only visual features or
task goals add to the attentional weight of a visual object, but also
its linguistic (e.g., phonological) and semantic properties. Indeed
this is what a number of models reported in the visual world lit-
erature do. Roy and Mukherjee’s (2005) probabilistic rule model
integrates sentence-level and visual information, such that each
word in an unfolding sentence incrementally inﬂuences the dis-
tribution of probabilities across the visual scene, based on the ﬁt
of the visual context with the current word. The distribution of
probabilities are interpreted as attentional distributions, such that
processing priority is assumed to be distributed over the visual
objects in the scene. According to Altmann and colleagues (Alt-
mann and Kamide, 2007; Altmann and Mirkovic, 2009), attending
to a language-matching visual object is an emergent property of
spreading activation. The visual and linguistic input overlap at
for example the semantic level, where they reinforce each other.
This increased activation then spreads back to the speciﬁc lin-
guistic and visual representations, including the visual location,
which then serves as a saccadic target. In the model of Mayberry
et al. (2009), attention is directed to identiﬁed visual regions in
order to establish a reference for the spoken input. The relation-
ship between language and vision is reciprocal, in that the referent
(i.e., attended) object in turn inﬂuences the interpretation of the
incoming speech. In other words, the language comprehension
system makes use of whatever information is available, including
visual information. This way, language becomes grounded in a
visual environment, in line with for example developmental ﬁnd-
ings. Likewise, a neural net implementation of the model learns
to interpret ambiguous linguistic input by attending to seemingly
relevant (i.e., matching) visual input. The net result is the same
as for the other models: matching visual input becomes more
strongly represented. Finally, in Kukona and Tabor’s (2011) recent
dynamical systems model of the visual world paradigm, attention
is expressed as a landscape of local attractors reﬂecting the visual
objects, a landscape that continuously changes on the basis of the
linguistic input.
Whereas psycholinguistics has welcomed attention into their
models, very few visual search studies have looked at the role
of language. One exception is a study by Wolfe et al., 2004; see
also Vickery et al., 2005), who compared visual search under ver-
bal (i.e., written) instructions to that under visual instructions.
Observers were asked to search a complex display for a unique
(but non-salient) target. The target changed from trial to trial, as
was indicated by an instruction. This instruction was either pictor-
ial in nature (i.e., it showed an exact picture of the target), or it was
a written description (e.g., it read“blue square”). Furthermore, the
SOA between the cue and the search display was varied. The results
showed that pictorial cues were very effective: already for SOAs of
200 ms, performance reached asymptote, and search was as fast
as in a baseline condition in which the target always remained
identical from trial to trial (and thus no instruction was neces-
sary). Performance was considerably worse for the written cues.
Search speed was never comparable to the baseline condition, and
even after 1600 ms (the greatest SOA measured) it had not reached
asymptote yet. This despite the fact that the written cues described
very simple visual forms that the observers had seen over and over
again during the course of the experiment. This suggests that, in
visual search, observers do not necessarily create a visual template
from a verbal description, and instead complete the task on the
basis of a less precise representation which could be linguistic in
nature, but is in any case more abstract than a visual template.
Whatever the precise model, note that for linguistic content to
be translated into a spatial attentional landscape, a considerable
binding problem needs to be solved, linking the phonological and
semantic codes to a speciﬁc visual location. Cognition needs what
has been referred to as grounding, situating, or indexing. This prob-
lem has been recognized by many (e.g., Richardson and Spivey,
2000; Kukona and Tabor, 2011), but so far has not been ade-
quately solved by visual world models. According to Altmann and
Mirkovic (2009), the increased activation of the overlapping rep-
resentations within a supramodal network automatically spreads
back to the matching object’s location. Such a network is not nec-
essarily a separate supramodal module in itself, but may emerge
from the global, linked activity in the range of networks involved
in representing the visual and linguistic input. Useful as it is as
a general explanatory framework, it begs the question as to how
a representation within such a network knows what the (spatial)
source is of its activity. If everything is active, how can one piece of
information be speciﬁcally bound to another? In the typical visual
world display, there are multiple objects, and hence multiple active
locations, any of which could be the source.Altmann andMirkovic
propose that an object’s location as well as its more symbolic prop-
erties are part of one and the same“representational substrate,”but
they left unspeciﬁed how this representational substrate would
look like.
The problem has been recognized within the attention litera-
ture,where the question boils down to how separate visual features
such as color andorientation canbe tied to a speciﬁc object or loca-
tion (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Treisman, 1996; Reynolds and
Desimone, 1999). One classic solution has been the idea that by
locally attending to an object, its features will become activated
together. Thus, attention causes binding. Obviously, this solution
does not sufﬁce here, since we try to explain exactly the opposite:
how the binding of information causes attention. One promis-
ing way of creating a representational conglomerate that includes
an object’s location as well as its identity is through local inter-
actions of feedforward and feedback mechanisms (e.g., Lamme
and Roelfsema, 2000; van der Velde and de Kamps, 2001; Hamker,
2004;Vanduffel et al., 2008). The idea is that a visual target object is
ﬁrst represented in low-level perceptual layers, which due to their
retinotopic organization and small receptive ﬁelds include detailed
spatial information. These layers then feed forward into layers that
eventually recognize the identity of the object. These higher lay-
ers are not retinotopically organized and due to large receptive
ﬁelds, location information is largely lost. Part of the recognition
layers will recognize the target object and become active accord-
ingly. This activity is fed back to the lower layers, but due to the
loss of location information this feedback is spatially non-speciﬁc.
However, the feedback can be made spatially speciﬁc by making it
interact with the feedforward activity that drove the recognition
in the ﬁrst place. That is, at each layer, the feedback is gated by,
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or correlated with the feedforward activity that fed into that layer.
Thus, the feedback trickles down the representational ladder and
becomes more and more localized, thus tying a recognition unit to
a speciﬁc visual instantiation. There is no a priori reasonwhy layers
representing linguistic information about visual objects could not
be linked in the same fashion, and thus create the representational
substrate proposed by Altmann and Mirkovic (2009).
In sum, little research so far has investigated the exact nature
of the attentional mechanisms underlying language-mediated
eye gaze. The most concrete proposal to date postulates that
language-mediated visual orienting arises because linguistic and
non-linguistic information and attention are instantiated in the
same common coding substrate. Local microcircuitries involv-
ing feedforward and feedback loops may instantiate such a
representational substrate.
MEMORY
As with virtually any cognitive process, the interactions between
language and eye movements involve memory. The question is
what types of memory are involved. There is no doubt that long-
term memory plays a crucial role, as it provides the semantic,
phonological, and visual knowledge base (or “type” representa-
tions) on which these interactions are based. Spreading activation
then travels along the associations formed within and between
these different types of knowledge networks. Indeed there is grow-
ing evidence that both visual and semantic knowledge stored
in long-term memory representations automatically affect visual
selection. For example, in a visual search task,Olivers (2011) asked
participants to search a display for a grayscale version of a known
trafﬁc sign. On each trial a distractor sign was presented in a color
which was either related or unrelated to the target sign. For exam-
ple, when looking for a black and white hexagonal STOP sign
(which is usually red in Europe) the distractor could be a red
triangular warning sign (related) or a blue square parking sign
(unrelated). Distractors interfered more with participants’ search
when the color of the distractor sign was related than when their
color was unrelated even though color was completely irrelevant
to the task. Apparently, the participants could not help but retrieve
the associated color. Similarly, Moores et al. (2003) found inter-
ference stemming from a conceptual relationship. For example,
when observers were asked to look for a picture of a motorbike,
they were more distracted by a picture of a helmet than a picture of
a football. Finally, Meyer et al. (2007) reported interference from
an overlap in object name, for example when observers were asked
to look for a bat (the animal), they were distracted by a picture
of a baseball bat. Similarly, Soto and Humphreys (2007) found
that after the instruction to remember the word “red,” observers
were more distracted by red objects in the display. Although some
working memory was involved in this study, the link between the
word and the visual color representation must obviously rely on
LTM knowledge.
However, as argued earlier, the mere spread of activation on
the basis of long-term links is insufﬁcient to explain such ﬁnd-
ings in visual search, as well as visual world behavior. Note that
both visual search and visual world displays are often character-
ized by a substantial degree of arbitrariness in the collection of
objects presented and the locations where these objects are put.
Unlike real world scenes in which particular objects are often
associated with particular locations (for example when opening
the fridge, the milk bottle is typically located in the lower door
compartment), in visual world displays the target object (e.g., the
“trumpet”) may be presented in the top left of the screen on one
trial, and in the bottom-right on the next. There is no a priori
long-term memory that links these objects to those locations, yet
attention is directed there. Some temporary memory therefore
seems necessary, a memory that links the type representations to
a “token” representation of the speciﬁc instance of an object in a
spatiotemporal world (also referred to as object ﬁles, indices, or
deictic pointers;Kanwisher,1987;Kahnemanet al., 1992;Pylyshyn,
2001; Spivey et al., 2004; Hoover and Richardson, 2008).
The nature of this temporary memory is subject to debate.
Some refer to it as being “episodic” (e.g., Altmann, 2004; Altmann
and Kamide, 2007), but that obviously says little about its exact
nature. The ﬁeld will need to answer questions such as whether the
binding of linguistic types to visual tokens is an implicit process,
occurring automatically, without much cognitive control and/or
awareness, or an explicit process, relying on the awareness of the
stimuli involved, and therefore subject to cognitive control but
also capacity limitations. Implicit representations are more likely
to last for a longer period, while shorter term explicit memories
are more subject to interference. Naturally, both types of mem-
ory may contribute to visual–linguistic interactions. An implicit
memory ismost clearly advocated byAltmann and colleagues (Alt-
mann andKamide,2007;Altmann andMirkovic, 2009),who argue
that visual world type interactions are inevitable given the auto-
matic spread of activation within a conglomerate of linguistic and
visual representations. As we have argued above, such an account
could work if the sprawl of activity can be channeled back to the
original source – something that can be achieved through gating
the feedback signal with the feedforward signal between layers of
representation (van derVelde and de Kamps, 2001). Another argu-
ment for an implicit mechanism is that visual world interactions
occur even though the visual and spoken input are often irrelevant
to the observer (i.e., there is no explicit physical task), suggesting
a substantial automatic component.
Others have advocated an important role for an explicit type
of memory, most notably working memory (Spivey et al., 2004;
Knoeferle and Crocker, 2007; Huettig et al., 2011a). The fact that
visual world effects occur despite the absence of a clear task does
not preclude such a contribution. After all, participants are at the
very least instructed to “just” look at the display and “just” listen
to the input, which may facilitate at least a partial entrance into
working memory. One reason for assuming this type of memory
comes from visual attention studies that suggest that the number
of visual tokens or indices that can be simultaneously maintained
is limited to four – a limit assumed to be the limit of visual work-
ing memory (Cowan, 2001). If visual world interactions depend
on such tokens, they would thus also depend on visual working
memory. But also on the psycholinguistic side, it has been argued
that working memory is a real prerequisite for disambiguating and
understanding language (Jackendoff, 2002, see also Marcus, 1998,
2001). It remains to be tested whether visual world effects are also
subject to a limit of four visual objects and how they respond to
different forms of cognitive load.
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One advantage of the explicit memory account is that it allows
the cognitive system to ﬂexibly juggle the maintenance of visual
memories between the internal and external world. As long as a
visual stimulus is present, in principle it sufﬁces to have only amin-
imal visual memory representation of them. Instead, the indices
or pointers can be used to refer to the location of the object, allow-
ing the cognitive system to only retrieve detailed percepts when
necessary. This way the world serves as an outside memory, limit-
ing the load on the cognitive system (O’Regan, 1992; O’Regan and
Noë, 2001; Spivey et al., 2004). This would mean that the spatial
pointers as alluded to when explaining visual world type effects
are not just side effects of a memory system that cannot help but
bind all sorts of information, but actually have a functional role
in establishing the memory in the ﬁrst place by directly referring
to the outside world (a reference that then may be sustained even
if the outside scene has been removed). A study by Wolfe et al.
(2000) is directly relevant here. In some of their experiments, they
presented observers with a visual search display that remained
constantly on screen from trial to trial. The speciﬁc target changed
from trial to trial (through an instruction in the center of the
screen). For example, the search display might always consist of a
red circle, a green square, a red triangle, and a blue diamond – all
continuously present in the same position. On the ﬁrst trial the
target may then be a green square, whereas on the next it may be
the red circle, and so on. Remarkably, even though the search dis-
play remained constant from trial to trial, search hardly improved.
Even after 300 trials there was no notable improvement in search.
Wolfe et al. (2000) concluded that no memory of the display was
built up, despite countless inspections. They argued that for the
lazy cognitive system, learning the display was unnecessary, since
the stimulus remained visible and could be used as an outside
memory. In contrast, when the search display was taken away after
the ﬁrst presentation, performance rapidly became fast and efﬁ-
cient. Now observers were forced to commit the items to internal
memory, making them more rapidly available for selection. This
ﬂexibility (as induced by task demands) suggests some form of
working memory, but it remains to be seen whether visual world
interactions are equally ﬂexible.
That working memory content can guide visual attention has
been shown in several studies now (Soto et al., 2005; Olivers et al.,
2006; Soto and Humphreys, 2007; Olivers, 2009). In these studies,
observers are asked to look for a simple visual shape target among
distracters, while keeping an unrelated object in working memory.
However, one of the search distracters can match the memorized
object (e.g., in color), and when it does, search suffers. It appears
that an object that matches the contents of working memory cap-
tures attention, something which has been conﬁrmed with eye
movement measures. Of course, the fact that working memory
can affect attentional guidance does not necessarily mean that it
also does so in visualworld settings. This remains to be investigated
(see Huettig et al., 2011a, for a more detailed review).
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DIFFERENCES
The vast majority of studies investigating language-mediated eye
gaze have been conducted with undergraduate students. This is
of course not only the case for studies using the visual world and
visuals search paradigms but a pervasive problem in experimental
psychology more generally (see Arnett, 2008). It is an open empir-
ical question how much one can generalize from the sophisticated
behavior of highly educated university students to draw general
inferences about mind and behavior beyond these narrow sam-
ples. Indeed it has been argued that the homogeneous Western
student participants used in most studies are the“weirdest” (West-
ern Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic) people in the world
and the least representative populations one can ﬁnd to draw gen-
eral conclusions about human behavior (Henrich et al., 2010, for
further discussion). Besides the theoretical challenges discussed
above, there are thus some empirical challenges, which research
on the interaction of the cognitive systems involved in language,
vision, attention, and memory, must address. One promising line
of inquiry will be the investigation of individual differences (see
McMurray et al., 2010, for an example). Another approach, and
one we shall discuss here in more detail, are studies with distinct
non-student participant populations. Recent studies investigating
language-mediated visual orienting in young children and in indi-
viduals with little formal schooling (i.e., low literacy levels) suggest
that this approach may prove to be particularly fruitful.
There is the possibility that the mapping between spoken words
and visual objects is mediated by stored verbal labels. Consider the
color effects reported by Huettig and Altmann (2004, 2011). On
hearing target words that are associated with a prototypical color
(e.g., “frog”), participants tend to look at objects displayed in that
color even though the depicted objects (e.g., a green blouse) are
not themselves associated with that prototypical color (see John-
son and Huettig, 2011, for a similar results with 36-month-olds).
Butwhen listeners hear theword“frog,”do they access an associated
stored color label (GREEN),which makes them more likely to look
at green things in their visual surroundings? Or, alternatively, do
listeners on hearing“frog”access a target template, a sort of veridi-
cal perceptual description of the target (including its color) which
then leads to a match with items matching this “perceptual” tem-
plate (as tends to be assumed in visual search studies)? Note that
verbal mediation is a genuine possibility; participants in free word
association tasks typically produce the answer “green”when asked
to write down the ﬁrst word that comes to mind when thinking
about “frog” (Nelson et al., 1998). Davidoff and Mitchell (1993)
for instance have argued that “3-year-olds have more difﬁculty
matching object colors with mental templates than they do with
color naming” (p. 133) based on the ﬁnding that their 3-year-old
participants tended to successfully judge that a banana is colored
yellow in a verbal task but failed to choose the yellow banana
as the correct one from differently colored bananas. Moreover,
developmental psychologists have argued that “early in life, sen-
sory, and linguistic color knowledge seem to coexist, but a proper
map connecting names and perception is late in developing” (p.
78, Bornstein, 1985).
To examine this issue, Johnson et al. (2011) tested 48 two-year-
olds who lacked reliable color term knowledge and found that on
hearing the spoken target words they looked signiﬁcantly more at
the objects that were either color-related or semantically related to
the named absent targets (e.g., on hearing “frog” they were more
likely to look at a green truck and a bird than completely unrelated
objects). Interestingly, there was a clear dissociation: words such
as “frog” resulted in shifts in eye gaze to green things but color
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words such as “green” did not. Thus, 2-year-olds look to color-
matched competitors even if they do not know the label for that
color. The Johnson et al. (2011) results do not rule out that adults
have both direct and indirect routes linking color knowledge of
words. What the Johnson et al. (2011) results suggest, however, is
that the direct perceptual route exists before the indirect, lexically
mediated route, has had a chance to develop.
Recent research involving adult individuals with little formal
schooling also provides new insights with regard to the mecha-
nisms and representations during language-mediated visual ori-
enting. Studies using the blank screen paradigm (Spivey and Geng,
2001;Altmann, 2004), in which participants preview a visual scene
and then listen to a spoken sentence while a blank screen is shown,
have found that people have a tendency to re-ﬁxate the regions on
the blank screen that were previously occupied by relevant objects.
Strong claims have been made regarding the nature of these“look-
ing at nothing” effects. Altmann (2004, cf. Richardson and Spivey,
2000) has proposed that “the spatial pointers are a component of
the episodic trace associated with each item – activating that trace
necessarily activates the (experiential) component encoding the
location of that item, and it is this component that automatically
drives the eyes toward that location” (p. B86). Similarly, Ferreira
et al. (2008) claimed that “whether the looks are intentional or
are unconsciously triggered, the conclusion is the same: looking at
nothing is an entirely expected consequence of human cognitive
architecture” (p. 409).
However, Mishra et al. (2011) have found that this is not a uni-
versal trait of human cognition.Mishra et al. (2011) studied Indian
low literates (2 mean years of formal schooling, but proﬁcient
speakers/listeners) and high literates (15 mean years of formal
schooling) on the same “look and listen” task as used by Altmann
(2004) to test these claims. If “looking at nothing” is an automatic
reﬂex of the cognitive system to refer to previously presented visual
objects, then it should be present in all proﬁcient speakers/listeners
regardless of their level of formal schooling. High and low literates
were presented with a visual display of four objects (a semantic
competitor, e.g., “kachuwa,” turtle, and three distractors) for 5 s.
Then the visual display was replaced with a blank screen and par-
ticipants listened to simple spoken sentences containing a target
word (e.g.,“magar,”crocodile,a semantic competitor of“kachuwa,”
turtle). High but not low literates looked at the empty region pre-
viously occupied by the semantic competitor as the spoken target
word was heard. In a follow-up experiment, the same participants
were presented with the identical materials except that the visual
display (containing the semantic competitor and the distractors)
was present as participants heard the spoken sentences. With such
a set up both low literates and high literates did shift their eye gaze
toward the semantic competitors immediately as the target word
was heard. In another study, Huettig et al. (2011d), found that
low literates also made fewer anticipatory eye movements than
high literates. Low and high literates (2 and 12 years of school-
ing) listened to simple spoken sentences containing a target word
(e.g., “door”) while looking at a visual display of four objects (the
target, i.e., the door, and three distractors). The spoken Hindi
sentences contained adjectives followed by the (semantically neu-
tral) particle wala/wali and a noun (e.g., “Abhi aap ek uncha wala
darwaja dekhnge,” Right now you are going to see a high door).
Adjective (e.g., uncha/unchi, high) and particle (wala/wali) are
gender-marked in Hindi and thus participants could use syntac-
tic information to predict the target. To maximize the likelihood
to observe anticipation effects, adjectives which were also seman-
tically and associatively related to the target object were chosen.
High literates started to shift their eye gaze to the target object well
before target word onset. Low literates’ ﬁxations on the targets
only started to differ from looks on the unrelated distractors once
the spoken target word acoustically unfolded (more than a second
later than the high literates).
Further research is currently underway to establish why these
populations differ in language-mediated eye movement behav-
ior (see also Huettig et al., 2011c). We know from control tests
that they do not depend on IQ. The results are also unlikely to
be due to differences in processing 2D information during pic-
ture processing. In a recent study we observed very high picture
naming accuracy scores in the low literate group. Moreover, in
Experiment 2 of Huettig et al. (2011d), low literates were not
slower than high literates in their shifts in eye gaze to the tar-
get objects when hearing the target word, they just did not use
contextual information to predict them before the target word
was heard. This makes it very unlikely that the observed pat-
tern of results is due to slow information retrieval during picture
processing. Instead, we conjecture that literacy is a main fac-
tor underlying differences in language-mediated anticipation. To
maintain a high reading speed, prediction is helpful if not neces-
sary. Reading and spoken language comprehension, for instance,
differ in the amount of information that is processed per time unit
(approx. 250 vs. 150 words/min). It has also been observed that
readers make use of statistical knowledge in the form of transi-
tional probabilities, i.e., that the occurrence of one word can be
predicted from the occurrence of another (McDonald and Shill-
cock, 2003). Low levels of reading and writing practice greatly
decreases the exposure to such word-to-word contingency statis-
tics in low literates. Huettig et al. (2011d) propose that formal
literacy may enhance individuals’ abilities to generate lexical pre-
dictions, abilities that help literates to exploit contextually relevant
predictive information in other situations such as when anticipat-
ing which object an interlocutor will refer to next in one’s visual
environment.
In terms of the absence of looks to the semantic competitors
by the low literates in the “blank screen” study it is less clear how
literacy may have mediated these results. An intriguing possibil-
ity is that the well-known “looking at nothing” effects (Spivey
and Geng, 2001; Altmann, 2004) reﬂect merely that participants
with high levels of formal education are more familiar with the
concept of experimentation and attempt to link “explicitly” the
previewed visual display and the unfolding spoken sentence when
viewing the blank screen and that low literates are much less likely
to do so. A related possibility is that high literates may simply be
better in correctly guessing the “purpose” of “blank screen” exper-
iments. Alternatively, it may be that working memory differences
underlie the differences between high and low literates’ “look-
ing at nothing” behavior. In any case, these results underscore
the need to investigate the behavior of non-student participant
populations. Ongoing research also examines the attentional basis
of these differences between low and high literates. What seems
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clear from these data is that the language–vision interaction is
modulated by cognitive factors which correlate with formal lit-
eracy and/or general schooling and thus accounts which assume
that this language-mediated eye movement behavior is automatic
or a non-trivial consequence of human cognitive architecture may
have to be revised.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
How will we be most likely to make progress in our understand-
ing of the mechanisms and representations shared by language,
vision, attention, and memory during language-mediated eye
gaze? Besides a focus on individual and group differences, neu-
roscientiﬁc approaches will undoubtedly prove to be important.
For example, activity in different brain areas may reveal at what
level linguistic and visual inputmaponto each other (ranging from
occipital to temporal areas), how this is translated into a saccadic
signal (ranging from parietal areas to the frontal eye ﬁelds, as well
as subcortical areas such as the superior colliculus), and to what
extent systems are involved that are typically associated with top-
down attention and working memory (such as the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex).
Computational modeling will also increasingly play an impor-
tant role (see Allopenna et al., 1998; Roy and Mukherjee, 2005;
Mayberry et al., 2009; Mirman and Magnuson, 2009; Stephen
et al., 2009; McMurray et al., 2010; Kukona and Tabor, 2011).
An advantage of such models is that theoretical notions and rep-
resentations underlying language-mediated eye gaze are explicitly
exposed. They also allow direct manipulation of representations,
processes, and speciﬁc factors (e.g., past experience, age of acquisi-
tion) which are difﬁcult to control in real participants. In addition,
novel predictions about human performance can be derived since
models often produce output phenomena which have not been
reported previously.
A further fruitful avenue of research is the investigation of
brain lesions using single case studies, studies involving groups of
patients, or the application of transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) on healthy participants. Patients suffering from Balint’s
syndrome, for instance, have brain damage to the left and right
parietal lobes and severe spatial deﬁcits. One particularly interest-
ing symptom is the difﬁculty that these patients appear to have
with the binding of different visual features of an object (e.g.,
color and shape, cf. Friedman-Hill et al., 1995). One question is
whether this type of lesion would also affect the binding of linguis-
tic information to visual locations, as in the visual world paradigm,
or whether linguistic information escapes the disintegration that
characterizes the visual features.
In sum, we conclude that the investigation of language-
mediated eye gaze is a useful approach to study the interaction
of linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive processes. The data
reviewed suggest that the representational level at which language–
vision mapping occurs is co-determined by the timing of cascaded
processing in the spoken word and object/visual word recognition
systems, by the temporal unfolding of the spoken language, and
by the nature of the visual environment (e.g., the characteristics
of the visual stimuli, and the possibility of other representational
matches). Themost concrete proposal regarding attentionalmech-
anisms to date postulates that language-mediated visual orienting
arises because linguistic and non-linguistic information and atten-
tion are instantiated in the same common coding substrate. We
suggest that local microcircuitries involving feedforward and feed-
back loops may instantiate such a representational substrate. We
further conclude that little is currently known about the exact
nature of the types of memory involved. Questions that remain
to be answered include whether the binding of linguistic types to
visual tokens is an implicit or an explicit process, occurs automat-
ically or is subject to cognitive control, whether it is restricted by
capacity limitations, and to what extent it suffers from interfer-
ence and decay. We conjecture that an explicit working memory
will be central to explaining interactions between language and
visual attention. Though much progress has been made it is clear
that a synthesis of further experimental evidence from a variety
of ﬁelds of inquiry, methods, and distinct participant populations
will prove to be crucial for our understanding about how language,
vision, attention, and memory interact.
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